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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This proceeding is now on review by this Court for a second time. 
Accordingly, this Court is somewhat familiar with the proceedings before it. In the 
first appeal were several issues that were not addressed at that time and they now 
appear in this proceeding. In the prior appeal this Court had before it the fact that 
your plaintiff-appellant had pending a motion to amend the complaint filed on 
December 20, 2010. An appearance, answer and a summary judgment motion on 
behalf of the defendant Ron Nelson were filed on November 17, 2010. Each parties' 
motions had been noticed for hearing on January 31, 2011 pursuant to Judge 
Stoker's order of Jan 3, 2011. Although some discussion by the Judge occurred at 
the hearing, no order was entered in regard to plaintiffs motion for leave to amend 
and the summary judgment issue was postponed to a later date uncertain. A 
hearing for Mr. Nelson's Summary Judgment was set for March 28 and Mr. Gladd set 
a hearing on his request to withdraw as counsel for your plaintiff on the same date. 
On the same day Judge Stoker permitted the withdrawal by Mr. Gladd and on the 
29th a copy of the order was posted to affiant. On April 12th Judge Stoker entered a 
summary judgment decision in favor of Mr. Nelson without giving appellant an 
opportunity to argue against the summary judgment request. Your plaintiff timely 
appeared, prose, and filed a motion asking the Court to set aside the Summary 
Judgment. Plaintiff also filed a motion seeking leave to supplement opposition to the 
summary judgment request. In the notice of hearing on those motions plaintiff also 
included notice of hearing plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Amend that had not been 
previously ruled on. Judge Stoker refused to permit appellant to argue the motion 
for leave to amend and denied the request to supplement opposition grounds or to 
set aside the Summary Judgment. The issue of wrongful denial of leave to amend 
reappears in this second appeal. 
Shortly after the hearing before Judge Stoker, counsel for Mr. Nelson made 
demand for payment of the award for fees and costs, threatening execution, on the 
award granted by Judge Stoker. The claim was promptly paid by your appellant. On 
receipt of this Court's opinion in the first appeal your appellant promptly sent to Mr. 
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Nelson's counsel a request for the return of those monies together with computed 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date that the monies were received 
by Wright Brothers Law Office. Request was also made for the payment of costs 
awarded by the Court of appeals with judgmental interest from the date of this 
Court's award. Appellant wanted these funds so as to be able to hire an attorney. 
Those requests were ignored and subsequently, in this proceeding, your appellant 
raised this issue before Judge Bevan. Finally on one attempt, in open Court, counsel 
for Mr. Nelson represented that Mr. Nelson would pay the money within a week. 
That did not occur. At the next hearing in open Court, March 18th, counsel for Mr. 
Nelson represented that the funds had been delivered to the clerks office that day. 
The Court then entered its Order to Disperse Funds which did not arrive until just 
days before the trial. 
This Court's Remittitur was received by the trial court in Twin Falls on July 
20, 2012 and by your appellant on July 23 rd. On the same date that the Remittitur 
was filed in the District Court Judge Stoker placed the matter on the trial schedule 
and sent out a order directing counsel of record to attend a scheduling hearing in 
Twin Falls. The Pre-trial Order requiring a personal appearance of counsel before 
the Court. Appellant, after receipt of the Remittitur, filed a notice of disqualification 
of Judge Stoker and thereafter a motion for disqualification on the basis of prejudice. 
The case was not at issue as to the defendants Powers and Armstrong at the time 
Judge Stoker placed the matter on the trial calendar although it was at issue as to 
the defendant Nelson. On August 20th Tom Holmes caused a stipulation for 
substitution of counsel to be filed and on the next day Brooke Redmond filed an 
appearance on behalf of the defendants Powers and Armstrong. This proceeding did 
not get at issue as to the defendants Powers and Armstrong until January 30, 2013 
at which time a responsive pleading was filed on behalf of these two defendants. 
Prior to Judge Stoker's withdrawal plaintiff was advised by Mrs. Redmond 
that appearance in Twin Falls would not be required if we could stipulate to a 
response to each and every question in Judge Stoker's Pre-trial Order and that was 
the only way possible to avoid a very expensive trip to Twin Falls. On September 
14th Judge Stoker entered an Order accepting counsels' stipulation and vacated the 
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scheduling conference. On September 17th Judge Stoker withdrew and Judge Bevan 
appointed himself as the successor. On September 19th Judge Bevan set a trial date. 
On December 10, 2012 plaintiff filed a Motion For Leave To Add Additional 
Parties. On December 11th a hearing was scheduled for January 7, 2013 concerning 
plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Amend filed on December 20, 2010 and on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Leave to Add Additional Parties. On December 12th defendants filed a 
Motion For Summary Judgment. Judge Bevan then reset the hearing on these 
motions for January 17th. Appellant travelled to Twin Falls and found that Judge 
Brody was conducting the hearing. Judge Brody denied plaintiffs motion for leave to 
amend and plaintiffs motion to add additional parties. Plaintiff also filed motions to 
vacate the trial date and/ or to reschedule a date giving plaintiff time to properly 
prepare, hopefully with an attorney. These motions and request for reconsideration 
of the denial of leave to amend were denied by the Court. Plaintiff had filed motions 
to vacate the trial setting or to postpone trial for the reason that appellant was not 
able to properly prepare the trial, that appellant was being rushed by counsel for 
the defendants and that no attorney was willing to consider assisting appellant on 
such short notice even if appellant had secured the large sum required as a retainer. 
Appellant was required to make a second expensive trip for a personal appearance 
before the Court lasting five minutes of the Court's time. The Court advised the 
parties to be in court for trial on April 2nd• That was it. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant is addressing the issues in this proceeding, in part, in a reverse 
manner by starting at the end. The trial Court, after dismissing plaintiffs complaint 
entered a judgment against plaintiff for a very large sum of money which included 
claims by counsel for attorney fees related to her preparation for a summary 
judgment, which when granted she lost on appeal. It also had a smaller claim for a 
second summary judgment, hastily filed as we approached a trial date and which 
was denied by the trial Court. In making it's decision to award fees the trial Court 
correctly determined that attorney fees could not be awarded pursuant to the terms 
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of the stockholder's agreement as claimed by Mrs. Redmond. Judge Bevan did, 
however, accept counsel's claim for fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3). 
Appellant does not agree as it is apparent that the Court did not look to the 
gravamen of the offense. This was not an arms-length business transaction. This was 
a personal matter for the benefit of Mr. Nelson who had given notice of resignation 
and wanted to do no more for the company. It was also a personal matter with Mr. 
Powers who wanted nothing further to do with Mr. Nelson. This was nothing more 
than an accounting and a redivision of assets and as such was far more a person 
matter than a business transaction. 
The Court in it decision to make Most of these charges appear in the claims of 
the defendants individually. Ron Nelson's claim includes charges of an attorney who 
has never appeared in this proceeding and has shown nothing to support a need for 
advice or assistance other than that provided by Mrs. Redmond. Mr. Holmes has 
filed a claim for fees incurred herein for which he did nothing more than file a notice 
of appearance and a notice of withdrawal. Appellant believes that some of the fees 
relate to work requested on behalf of Mr. Powers and issues related to H & M which 
may even have been incurred prior to the filing of the complaint in this proceeding 
or related to his activities in formulating an agreement un related to the issue of the 
Prater stock. Mr. Powers makes a claim for attorney fee that he did not pay but 
which in fact were paid by H & M in which plaintiff remains a stockholder. The 
failure of the Court to not give these claims a closer look has deprived appellant of a 
constitutional right to be heard and might result in unjust enrichment to each 
defendant as counsel has already caused the issuance of a Writ of Execution for the 
judgment amount without considering appellants offset for a cost bill against Mr. 
Nelson as well as accrued interest on monies previously taken. The award of 
attorney fees should be reversed for recomputation by the trial court in the event 
that the judgment of dismissal is sustained including any set-off of which the Court 
was previously made aware. 
Judge Given, in his findings of fact, nos. 3 and 4, indicted that he was 
addressing the issue of fraudulent concealment. He noted that the parties in this 
proceeding were each stockholders in H & Mand that Mr. Nelson had an 
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employment agreement with the company. He found there was not a ninety day 
waiting time from the meeting in February to the meeting in May but gave no effect 
to that point. He continued, acknowledging that plaintiff had no knowledge of these 
meetings, but then concluded that there was no evidence of fraudulent concealment 
precluding, in effect, the commencement of a five year statute of limitation. The 
Court's finding No. 17 is totally inconsistent with Idaho law. Idaho law has always 
been that every contract in Idaho has an implied covenant of a requirement of good 
faith and fair dealing. It is not fair to omit a notice required by operating rules 
requiring notice. Silence is not golden. Directors have an obligation to speak with 
each other particularly in a closely held corporation as was H & M. It was not 
necessary for appellant to label the lack of notice as fraudulent. The act or lack of an 
act in and of itself establishes the fraud involved. The acts of the defendants were 
indeed concealed from the plaintiff and the statute could not begin to run until a 
reasonable time to find the details of the wrongdoing had passed. The finding of fact 
nos. 17 and 19 are not supported by the evidence and the dismissal of the complaint 
was an error of law requiring reversal. 
In finding of fact no. 18 the Court accurately determined that plaintiff had a 
small increase in his percentage interest in the company as the company retained 
some of the Prater stock Judge Bevan, for some reason, however neglected to 
consider the provision of the shareholders agreement that gives each individual 
stockholder a right to a pro rata share in accord with the existing ratios. He 
overlooked the changes resulting from the undisclosed acts of the other directors 
and Mr. Nelson. As was reflected in the 2004 record Mr. Armstrong and plaintiff had 
equal pro rata shares. His action of acquiring 6 additional shares established that 
his percentage increase would violate the pro rata clause of the agreement and 
would be a little more than an additional 13.3% greater increase than appellant's 
increase. In Mr. Nelson's situation owning only 27 shares his increase would be 
very close to 75%. The only way to for a pro rata ratio to remain in effect was to 
have issued no shares of the Prater stock The finding that appellant incurred no 
damages by the issuance of the stock cannot be sustained. The breach of the pro 
rata provision was a breach of the implied covenant of fair dealing and did cause 
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plaintiff to suffer harm. Anytime there is an increase of stock shares to one owner 
from another, particularly a minority stock holder, a loss occurs. Such a loss is 
indeed damaging and was certainly more than one dollar. Judge Bevan's finding of 
fact no. 19 is also not supported by the evidence and his finding no. 20 ignores the 
covenant of fair dealing and should also be set aside. 
The trial Court entered a finding, (No. 10), that it was" determined "that a 
Prater sale would be made and that H & M would be the purchaser. The same 
finding indicated that it was also " determined " that the company would transition 
from a two party management to single management with the defendant Nelson 
having all management rights and obligations. The Court correctly found that your 
appellant had no knowledge of this transaction. The Court erred, however, in 
asserting, and then relying on, it's finding that the instrument effected a 
"determination". No notice of proposed sale was ever mailed to appellant as 
required by the corporate by-laws. As such the meeting and action supposedly 
taken was a nullity for non-compliance with operating procedural rules. 
Additionally it was also void for the reason that the instrument did not bear the 
signatures of the directors alleged to have waived notice. A waiver requires the 
signature of the director to be effective as demonstrated on defendants Exhibit D 
and plaintiffs exhibit no. 4. More significantly this purported meeting of the 
subchapter S corporation stockholders was void ( emphasis supplied) for the reason 
that it failed to comply with Idaho's corporate code as an agreement for corporate 
redemption. It did not contain therein a provision that any redemption of stock 
required a caveat provision that any redemption must be paid out of capital surplus. 
Appellant would remind the Court that the stockholders agreement precluded 
redemption, in accord with the Idaho corporate code, as was plainly intended at the 
time the agreement was written and the corporation was created. 
Judge Bevan identified the meeting of April 2 as the "trigger" for the 
commencement of the five year statute of limitations which time had passed a few 
days before the complaint was filed. That too is error as again the document or, 
notice, if any, was not mailed to your appellant and has not been properly executed. 
Without an agreement for redemption there can be no sale or purchase of stock by 
11 
virtue of the stockholders restricted sale agreement. An agreement cannot be based 
upon a void agreement. At the most it might be figuratively considered as the 
"loading of the gun" but then only with blank shells. The factual "trigger and 
discharge" occurred at a date uncertain, after September 30th, when the defendant 
Armstrong did the accounting for the end of the fiscal year and allocated profits in 
accord with a newly adjusted share rather than the pro rata share resulting from the 
purported issuance of additional shares to the defendants. This date was well within 
a five year statute of limitation and could not be related back to any date prior to 
September 30, 2009, a date subsequent to the filing of the complaint. Judge Bevan 
found that appellant had not been notified or informed by the respondents in 
regards to the Prater stock but had received information, the annual report, late in 
the year which should have put affiant on reasonable notice that something had 
occurred. It should be noted that the clever language utilized by the defendant 
Armstrong in that report did not set forth who bought stock or how much stock was 
sold. It should also be note that this was not an "arms length" transaction and that 
each of the alleged purchasers did not make a single dime payment. The annual 
payment made at the end of the year did not finance the payments made monthly to 
Prater. 
The defendant-respondent was a general manager of the corporation and he 
never disclosed his purported purchase of 20 shares of the stock from H &M. He had 
disclosed that he had purchased some Prater stock when he attempted to purchase 
my stock even on the day prior to the scheduled stockholder meeting in early March 
2009. He also failed to personally comply with the 60 day notice requirement of a 
proposed sale of his stock to Dave Powers and "the company." Appellant attempted 
to amend the complaint in this regard as it was newly discovered material evidence 
that created greater injury to appellant than did the undiscovered sale involving the 
Prater stock. He also had a fiduciary duty to disclose that he had become the sole 
general manager of H & M as he was well aware that appellant was a director of the 
corporation and that it was reasonable to keep directors involved on such matters. 
This he did not do. Mr. Nelson had an employment agreement with the board of 
directors of H & M to whom he was required to be responsible. A breach of contract 
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consists of a failure without legal excuse to perform any promise that forms the 
whole or part of a contract. Plaintiffs proposed amendment to the action against 
him sets forth many promises that were not kept. Mr. Nelson had obligations and 
duties both as a stock holder and as an employee of H & M. Evidence existed that 
appellant tried to bring into these proceedings by amendment that established a 
failure to perform duties in the contract. He certainly knew that he was violating his 
stockholder agreement when he entered into an agreement for a sale of stock 
without giving notice just as he knew that he was not meeting his responsibilities of 
his employment agreement which he did not reveal to any of the directors. As 
appellant asserted in his affidavits new evidence of facts had been discovered after 
the filing of the complaint in that regard. Mr. Nelson proposed his stock sale and 
had not personally fulfilled his notice obligation under the stockholders agreement. 
Additionally some needed information upon which to establish an amount of 
damage was still being awaited. The refusal of the trial court to allow an amendment 
of the complaint against Nelson on the same grounds as existed with respect to the 
Prater stock was both error and a manifest abuse of discretion. The denial of an 
amendment, based on new evidence of wrongdoing that effected the financial status 
of H & M was also a manifest abuse of discretion and operated as an unjust 
enrichment to Mr. Nelson and an indirect damage to plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant contends that justice has not prevailed in this proceeding. The 
basic principle that great liberty should be given in the granting of a request for an 
amendment of pleadings exists in Idaho. To be able to fully present one's claim is a 
basic proposition of constitutional law. The injustice that has resulted from the 
dismissal of appellant's claim has in effect resulted in an unjust enrichment in favor 
of the defendants. The dismissal judgment entered by the trial Court should be 
considered void as the Court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power 
constituting a violation of due process. These defendant's each have contributed to 
the destruction of a bona fide small business in Twin Falls, Idaho which, but for the 
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conduct of the defendant Ron Nelson, might still be a viable business. To appellant 
this is very destructive and some balance of loss can only come from the reversal of 
the judgment of dismissal entered by the trial court. As a minority stockholder, the 
denial of an opportunity to approach the claim for damages on other viable legal 
theories precluded presentation of misconduct by these defendants and was both 
error and a manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court proceedings. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JOHrfB. KUGLER / 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of Appellant's Brief were served on the 
respondents by mailing the same to Brooke Baldwin Redmond, P.O. Box 226, Twin 
Falls, ID, 83303 this 24th day of February, 2014. 
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